Older blog<\/a> 19 June, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n\nI find that, after three months\n of protest and numerous articles written on the subject, Syria remains a\n mystery to western readers and media alike. With all due respect to \nspecialists in Syrian affairs, who added tremendously to our knowledge \nand understanding of Syria, a first-hand experience of a native of the \ncountry is still needed to elucidate certain issues that outsiders will \nrarely see or understand. Syria is still \u201cthe kingdom of silence\u201d, to \nuse the words of the prominent Syrian dissident Riyad al-Turk. It is a \nmystery enveloped in silence and thrown in the deepest abyss of fear. \nNonetheless, plenty of hope for the future of Syria is in the air, and, \nfor the first time, it is well justified. Syria will unravel with every \nday of protest, every voice raised, every protester killed, and every \nword written about it. In addition to patience and courage, well in \nsupply these days, we need to talk about Syria; both Syrians and others \nneed to talk about Syria because it would be a victory for non-violent \nactivism. It will set the stage for 21st century activism if the Syrian \nuprising, as it is proceeding now, manages to effectuate a change of its\n ruling regime; one of few remaining Cold War era Stalinist regimes.
\nGiven the dearth of information about Syria, even specialists find \nthemselves depending on newspapers, oral interviews, and autobiographies\n to write the country\u2019s history, especially for the period beyond the \n1950\u2019s. Therefore, there are so many topics worthy of discussing in \norder to reach some understanding of the situation today; an \nunderstanding that could enable the observer to formulate a prediction \nabout the near future. Although no oil worthy of international attention\n exists in Syria, the country\u2019s location and history make it an \nimportant link in the chain of events unraveling today in the Middle \nEast. Many analysts fear a great mayhem in the region if the Assad \nregime in Syria fell, because of this regime\u2019s connections with Iran, \nHizbullah in southern Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and many other Palestinian\n organizations still hostile to Israel and to the peace process. This \nfear could be justified on historical grounds, but the future always has\n great ways of proving our predictions wrong because we actually never \nsee the full picture but focus on the worst case scenario when we are \nafraid and on the best case scenario when we are hopeful. A middle \nground would be to gather as many factors at play as possible and to \ndiscuss all possible scenarios, at least all the ones we could think of.\n Some of the main questions asked today are:* What kind of an uprising we have in Syria and how well organized is it?* Who is in charge on the protesters\u2019 side and who is in charge on the government\u2019s side?* Why should there be an uprising in Syria any way?* Is it really a peaceful uprising and how do we explain the wildly conflicting reports about it?* How can we explain the level of violence and the number of people killed?* For a country of 23 millions, why the number of protesters is relatively small?* What role does sectarianism play in the uprising?* Could the situation degenerate into a civil war?* If there is an end in sight, how would it look like and when would it come?* Whom to believe and how do we get good information about what is happening on the ground?* Why are the EU and the USA so inactive and mildly responsive about the events in Syria?* What role does the new social media play in the uprising? Is it really a Facebook revolution?
\nI cannot answer all of \nthese questions now, but I will give my opinion to the questions I \nconsider important for starting to understand the issues at stake, and \nleave the rest to future articles. As I develop more satisfactory \nexplanations, I will write them in this blog, because there are issues \nthat even a native needs to research in order to give an informed \nopinion.
\nPutting aside the \nacademic debate of whether the Arab protests are revolutions or \nuprisings or revolts because it does not matter now, I will refer to \nwhat is happening in Syria as the Syrian uprising. This is because it is\n indeed a rising up of segments of the Syrian population against \noppression and bad central management. Moreover, regardless of whether \none agrees or disagrees with the protesters, the fact that there is even\n one person who is protesting is significant for a balanced analysis of \nthe situation. One may call the protesters revolutionaries or thugs, \npeaceful or violent, sincere or agenda-driven, however, somebody is out \nthere and is shouting because he\/she has demands (legitimate or not). \nOne should first acknowledge the events before attempting to explain \nthem. As for naming and judgment calls, they are a part of the politics \nof the event; they are part of the fight and will be regarded as \nevidence, not analysis. One can simply count the number of protesters in\n any given video posted on the web to find out that the Syrian protests \nare real and range in magnitude between tens to thousands of protesters,\n and at rare time tens of thousands of protesters. Using the rule \nstating that for every social action, the number of supporters is about \nten times the number of participants, we can conclude that a wide \nranging movement of protest really exists in Syria. It is surprising to \ndiscuss the mere existence of this movement, but this is a testimony to \nhow isolated Syria is from the rest of world and to how effective the \ngovernment propaganda is, which denies even the existence of \ndiscontented citizens and insists on attributing its military \nintervention to countering the activities of armed gangs roaming the \ncountry unimpeded and reeking random havoc.
\nAm I biased in my opinion\n and analysis against the government? Certainly, but it is not an \nuninformed bias. I am calling it bias because I am not an eyewitness to \nthe events. I get my information from previously lived experiences, \nbooks and articles read, family contacts, and the internet. The model I \nhave of Syria leads to conclusions that conform to the news I hear on \nthe different media outlets and internet sources. It is a detective\u2019s \nwork indeed, but historians are nothing but text-based detectives. \nAlthough the events are taking place now, the nature of the information \navailable, i.e. being based in text, makes any analytical attempt look \nlike a historian\u2019s work. My knowledge of the Syrian regime, whether \nbased on lived experience or reading, makes me comfortably sure that \nnothing resembling a truth comes from its media. Syria is an Orwellian \nstate par excellence, albeit less tidy than Orwell\u2019s story. I am \nreferring to George Orwell\u2019s novel 1984 describing a Stalinist state, \nwhere everything is rewritten to fit an official narrative and where \nsurveillance is so pervasive that people tend to reproduce the official \nnarrative in their actions and speech. Journalists unaware of this fact \nmake the mistake of asking random people about their stories and \nopinions without first establishing a rapport with them and build a good\n degree of trust. Therefore, most what these journalists get is the \nofficial narrative, especially if they make the even worse mistake of \nasking a government official no matter how lowly he ranks in the \nbureaucracy. A supporter of the government may believe in its story, \nregardless of whether it is correct or not, but an opponent will also \nproduce a similar story out of fear. Therefore, for journalists, the \nmajority of whom do not even speak Arabic, it is very difficult to know \nthe real leaning of their interlocutors, let alone the correctness of \nthe information they are providing. One way to counter this built-in \nbias of the information received is to cross-examine them, receive as \nmuch information from as many sources as possible, make non-verbal \nobservations, read reports written by foreign diplomats and intelligence\n services, learn the history of the country, have a first-hand \nexperience of it, and most importantly spend some time in the country in\n order to build a network of trusted friends from all backgrounds.
\nThe extent of the \ndishonesty, as well as the brutality, of the current Syrian regime comes\n as a shock to new readers, but there are reasons behind this dishonesty\n and brutality. Dictatorial mentalities are not unknown in the Middle \nEast; for me, they are results of a broader patriarchal culture. This is\n a dangerous generalization, especially for a country in transition like\n Syria, as well as many Middle Eastern countries. However, the general \noutlook of the Syrian culture (or cultures) remains patriarchal. Father \nfigures are omnipresent in the culture, with their absolutist rule, \npervasive presence, uncompromising stands, know-it-all attitudes, \ndisregard of opposing opinions, oppressive behavior, and demands of \nabsolute obedience from subordinates. Many cultures or subculture have \nsuch figures, even in the West. Moreover, there are many subcultures or \nmicrocosms in Syria that do not have such figures. Nonetheless, \nespecially when it comes to the ruling circles, these figures abound. \nThe short lived Syrian democracy (mainly the 1950\u2019s) did not give the \nSyrian political milieu enough time and experience to develop more \naccepting and democratic figures. The younger generation certainly looks\n more promising in this regard. A quick look at Syria\u2019s short political \nhistory (political life started effectively in the 1930\u2019s) shows a \nfierce competition between ideologies and political parties that were \nintent on eliminating their opponents by all means possible. With the \nincreasing politicization of the army, especially in the 1960\u2019s, \nphysical elimination became the rule. Each year, as the coups d\u2019etats \nmultiplied, new precedents of intolerance and Machiavellism were set; \nwhich made the Syrian political game look like a mafia war. Hafiz \nal-Assad was not only the winner in this game, but also the last one \nstanding, owing it to his secretiveness, brutality, backstabbing deals, \nand lack of firm convictions other than his own interest and that of his\n family.
\nThis is Assad the father,\n but what about Assad the son, the current president? The answer is \nsimple, there is no difference. In Syria now, it is not the president \nwho rules, but an entire system erected by the father. I would even go \nas far as saying that the father rules Syria from his grave. Assad the \nfather spent no less than the last ten years of his life preparing to \npass the rule of Syria to his sons. The eldest was the most groomed for \nthe job but he died in a car crash in 1994. A total restructuring of the\n regime was needed in order to pass it to the second in line, the \ncurrent ruler Bashar, because of his lack of skills and loyal entourage \nas well as the refusal of many members of the old guard to submit to the\n rule of a 34 year old inexperienced physician. Assad the father made \nsure that the system would function according to his planning regardless\n of the level of skill of his son. Many foreign diplomats remarked on \nthe latter\u2019s lackluster personality and his inexperience. So, the \ndishonesty and brutality of the father\u2019s regime continued in the son\u2019s \nregime but under a veneer of a modernist look made possible by the \nservices of public relations companies. Yes, the image of Bashar as a \nreformer and a modernist that convinced even his people was not of his \nmaking. In fact, the European Union in general, and France in particular\n played a big role in making and marketing this image as part of a \nlarger project of reorganizing the Mediterranean basin in order to make \nit into a safe backyard for a revived and unified Europe. Syria was to \nbecome Europe\u2019s foothold in the eastern Mediterranean just like Egypt \nwas (and still is) for the USA. There is a great deal of dishonesty in \nthe regime\u2019s outer image, which must be protected by a great deal of \ndisinformation. The fa\u00e7ade was important for the father, in order to \nproject more power and legitimacy than he really had, and it is still \nvery important for the son for similar reasons. Furthermore, the \nStalinist style of ruling the father adopted depended on a great deal of\n fear rather than a constant use of force, a fear propagated by a few \nbut excessively vicious strikes and an uninterrupted stream of rumors \nand misinformation directed to the inside of the country as well as to \nthe outside. This aspect of the regime, which is tied to the very \npowerful security agencies, has been passed to the son, in addition to \nthe son\u2019s own lies and dishonesty in portraying himself and his regime. \nThis explains why it is so difficult to trust anything the regime says. \nIt is unfortunate that we have to spend any time debunking the lies of \nthis regime because our focus should be on understanding Syria\u2019s \nprospects for the future.
\nIn the coming articles I \nwill attempt to answer the questions I raised above. It was however \nnecessary to spend some time clarifying my approach to the situation in \ngeneral so as to clarify built-in biases and attitudes, because no \nhistorian or social scientist is ever \u201ccured\u201d of them. I hope you bear \nwith me because this is my style even in urgent matters; which also \nfunctions as a guard against inconsistencies in methodology due to \npersonal involvement in the subject of study. My style is constructive \nin the sense that I start by laying down the basic assumptions and \nattitudes; then I start constructing my explanations from the past, \nprogressing toward the present and the future. This will certainly take \ntime to develop. Finally, my reader, have no doubts, I do not claim \nobjectivity, and my hatred for the Assad regime will be clear in my \nwritings if it has not already transpired. What I hope for is to explain\n this hatred rather than hide it under a fake cover of objectivity.\n\n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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